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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BLAINE BARNARD, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Case No. 19080 
vs. 
RUTH D. BARNARD and 
PAUL D. BARNARD, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents agree with Appellant's statement of the 
nature of the case. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondents agree with Appellant's statement of the dis-
position in lower court. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
nespondents request that the judgment of the lower court 
be al'firmed in all its particulars. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents generally agree with Appellant's Statemer1 t 
of Facts, however, feel that the following amplification and 
clarification is in order. 
The contract referred to for the sale of two acres of 
Ruth's land to Blaine was an oral agreement wherein Ruth agreed 
to sell to Blaine two acres to be possessed by him "after the 
fall harvest after (her) death." (R. 33). 
The two acres would have had to come qut of Ruth's total 
land which was an irregularly shaped parcel containing approxi-
mately seven acres. (See Appendix I). 
The oral agreement was lacking in the indications where 
the boundaries of the two acres would be, but that it was to 
border on Blaine's land, the Allen land and the Church land's 
north boundary. That there were no other indications where the 
remaining boundaries would be, specifically there was no indi-
cation where the east boundary would be located. (R. 84). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNLESS THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DIS-
CRETION IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE FACTS 
AND AMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW, THE ThIAL 
COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE DISTIJFiBfoD. 
This Court's doctrine of review has t,een w•c; 1 t':-t ·it·-
lished and the Ccurt has repeatedly sLJlerJ tti:lt "uriL·ss ttw 
District Court abused its discretion in the determination of the 
facts and application of the law, the judgment of the District 
Court should not be disturbed." Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374, 
1377 (Utah, 1980). 
Appellant has not shown where the District Court abused 
its discretion in the determination of the facts in this case. In 
fact a close examination of the configuration of the land in-
volved would indicate that the trial court did all it could in 
attempting to establish the boundaries of the land which was 
allegedly sold. 
Appendix I indicates where the difficulty comes in 
when establishing the exact boundaries of the land to be con-
veyed. The Court found that the two acres to be sold was gen-
erally located in the northwest corner of Ruth's seven acre 
parcel of land. The Court further found that the land was to 
border on Blaine's (Appellant's) land, the Allen land and the 
Church land's north boundary. 
Simple mathematics would show that the difficulty comes 
when deciding where the agreement would have the balance of the 
two acre property run. As the examples in Appendix II and 
Appendix III show, the two acres could be determined to run 
contiguous to the Church land, in which case the two acre parcel 
would be shaped as indicated in Appendix II, or it could be 
determined as only going as far south as the Church land's 
-3-
northern boundary, in which case the two acre parcel would be 
shaped as shown in Appendix III, which is approximately what 
Appellant's two acre legal description would show. 
Clearly, the determination of the eastern boundary of 
the two acre parcel would determine the location of the southern 
boundary and the configuration of the land. 
This Court has as 1·ecently as this year indicated that: 
"the trial court's findings are accorded a presumption of valid-
ity and correctness and this court will not disturb the findings 
if there is substantial support for them in the evidence." 
Young v. Moore, 663 P.2d 78 (Utah, 1983) citing Litho Sales, 
Inc. v. Cutrubus, 636 P.2d 487 (Utah, 1981). 
In Young, supra, this Court also reiterated its position 
that this Court will not upset the trial court's findings if the 
evidence does not clearly preponderate against them. 
The trial court here heard all of the evidence presented 
to it, observed the witnesses and examined the various exhibits 
introduced. Appellant fails to show what evidence the Court 
ignored or misinterpreted. He cannot show this because from 
the record before this Court there is no indication of it. 
All that Appellant can claim is that there was an oral 
agreement for the sale of a future interest of a two acre piece 
of land which would be located in the northwest cornt·r of sel-
-4-
ler's seven acre piece of land. The record is totally lacking in 
any preciseness of the boundaries of the two acre parcel and thus 
the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts it had 
before it. 
POINT II 
IN ORDER FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF AN ORAL 
CONTRACT TO BE AVAILABLE, THE PLAINTIFF MUST 
ESTABLISH THE CONTRACT BY CLEAR, CONVINCING, 
AND DEFINITE EVIDENCE. 
Specific performance is a doctrine of equity which 
essentially requires a showing of the terms of the contract with 
sufficient preciseness so that the Court is certain of the intent 
of the parties. 
This Court has set forth the requirements of what has to 
be proven before the remedy of specific performance will be 
granted. Thus in Reed v.Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah, 1980), this 
Court in discussing specific performance in a case involving a 
written contract said: "Before specific performance will be 
employed by the courts to enforce a contract the terms of the 
agreement must be reasonably certain so the parties know what is 
required of them, and definite enough that the courts can del-
ineate the intent of the contracting parties." 610 P.2d at 1377. 
The Court then cited from 71 Am. Jur. 2d, Specific Per-
formance, Sec. 33, p. 53, as follows: 
For specific performance is demanded that 
degree of certainty and definiteness which 
leaves in the mind of the court no reasonable 
doubt as to what the parties intended, and 
-5-
' 
,i 
·! 
no reasonable doubt of the specific thing 
equity is to compel to be done ... in deter-
mining whether a contract is too uncertain to 
be specifically enforced, the test is whether 
the parties understood by the terms used what 
was intended in the agreement, and whether 
their minds met with respect thereto. 
610 P.2d at 1377. 
Clearly Appellant cannot show more than the general 
location of the two acres to be sold, that is, that the property 
to be sold would be in the northwest portion of the seven acres 
of land owned by Ruth. He attempts to.argue that an exact 
description is unnecessary because all that was necessary is 
that the general location of the property to be sold be µnder-
stood. 
Appellant supports his position by referring the Court 
to various cases where the property to be sold was referred 
to in general terms rather than described by metes and bounds. 
However, each of the cases cited by Appellant deal with contracts 
in writing, whereas here the contract is oral and consequently 
requires a greater burden. 
This Court early on decided that: "Where a party seeks 
specific performance of a parol contract in equity, he must 
establish the terms thereof with a greater degree of certainty 
than would be required to establish the same contract in action 
at law." Montgomery v. Berrett, 121 P. 569 (Utah, 1912). 
In Montgomery, Id., 
"Equity requires as a condition of specific pcrtormance 
-G-
mutual understanding and a positive assent of both sides as to 
the terms of the contract." 121 P. at 570. 
This doctrine has been a consistent part of our law, as 
was generally reiterated in Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54 (Utah, 
1980), where the Court said: "The evidentiary burden is upon 
Plaintiff, in seeking specific performance of an oral contract to 
convey land, to establish the contract by clear, convincing, and 
definite evidence... Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v.Ballard, Utah, 
534 P.2d 611 (1975)." 618 P.2d at 55. 
The Ryan, supra, and Holmgren, supra, theory was recog-
nized in Young v. Moore, supra. In the case before the Court 
there has been no showing of the contract by clear, convincing 
and definite evidence. 
The cases involving written contract relied on by 
Appellant in his brief are not applicable to this case notwith-
standing the foregoing. 
Appellant relies on Staufer v. Call, 589 P.2d 1219 
(Utah, 1979), where the written contract referred to the pro-
perties in general terms which would allow a party utilizing only 
the clues contained in the written agreement to go to the ground 
and accurately locate the parts intended to be sold. It refer-
red, for example, to two houses using the natural boundaries, 
fenced natural farm ground on the SE (south side from Interstate 
Freeway) and ground SE of the old highway. Staufer, 589 P.2d at 
1 L u • 
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The cases are consistent in holding that an exact legal 
description in a written contract need not be required in order 
to enforce the contract, provided the property to be sold 
otherwise be ascertained. 
can 
Thus in Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah, 1980) the 
written agreement for the sale of real property described the 
property in vague and incomplete terms, i.e. "corner of Hillview 
and Ninth East," the Court indicated that: "the extrinsic 
evidence presented by the Plaintiff concerning the transaction 
defines the subject matter in question in sufficient detail to 
support specific performance." 610 P.2d at 1377. 
The Reed Court went on to indicate the type of evidence 
presented at trial regarding the acquisition by the Defendants 
and the construction of a fourplex apartment unit on each lot and 
the selection of each unit as belonging to certain purchasers. 
The Court then said: "Thus, everyone connected with the deal 
knew what land was involved and the ambiguous nature of the terms 
used in the written agreement when viewed in light of the extra-
neous evidence presented at trial does not render the contract 
unenforceable or defeat an action for specific performance." 610 
P.2d at 1378. 
Here there is no extrinsic evidence which sheds any more 
light on the contract. The Appellant has simply not proven what 
the agreement was in re11ard to the property boundci,0 iE< anJ thus 
specific performance is not available to him. 
Similarly, Jacobsen v. Cox, 202 P.2d 714 (Utah, 1949), 
cited by Appellant is not applicable since the contract there was 
in writing and referred to the land involved in certain, although 
general, terms. The property was described by use of fences, 
general names, i.e. "Spring Branch Ditch, Cox Field," etc. The 
land was not surveyed since all parties knew the exact location 
of the property involved, had been familiar with and used it for 
many years, had described it in documents by reference to fences, 
natural monuments, and size and occupancy. 
The Court, citing from American Jurisprudence, said: 
A description is sufficient when read in the 
light of circumstances of possession, owner-
ship, situation of those parties, and their 
relation to each other and to the property, as 
they were when the negotiations took place and 
the writing was made, it identifies the 
property. A description is sufficient, 
although vague in respect of the boundaries, 
if it identifies a specific tract of land when 
applied to the facts on the surface of the 
earth, as where a surveyor, with the contract 
in his hands and with the aid of no other 
means than those provided, could go to the 
place stated therein and accurately locate the 
land. 
Jacobsen, supra, 202 P.2d at 721. 
Certainly, even if the agreement here was in writing, 
could it not be claimed that a surveyor could go to the northwest 
corner of Ruth's land and state where the boundries of the two 
acre parcel would fall. Had the agreement been for all of the 
land owned by Ruth the results would have been differrent since 
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